

# THE AIR LAND SEA BULLETIN



Issue No. 2004-1

Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center

January 2004

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
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Staff Sgt Aaron D. Allmon II

An F-16 CJ Fighting Falcon from Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina, flies in support of Operation NOBLE EAGLE for North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). More than 33,000 sorties have been flown during Operation NOBLE EAGLE. Story on page 5.

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# **THE AIR LAND SEA BULLETIN (ALSB)**

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**Submissions:** We solicit articles and reader's comments. Contributions of 1500 words or less are ideal. Submit contributions, double-spaced in MS Word. Include name, title, complete unit address, telephone numbers, and e-mail address. Graphics can appear in article, but you must also provide a separate computer file for each graphic. Send E-mail submissions to [alsaeditor@langley.af.mil](mailto:alsaeditor@langley.af.mil). ALSA Center reserves the right to edit content to meet space limitations and conform to *The ALSB's* style and format. **Next issue: May 2004; Submission DEADLINE:** close of business, April 1, 2004.

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Secretary of the Army

Commander, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

## DIRECTOR'S COMMENTS - NEW DIRECTOR, SAME COMMITMENT TO BRIDGING GAPS

Forever, "CHANGE" will be on the tips of our tongues at the ALSA Center. It is inherent in our mission of meeting the immediate needs of the warfighter.

This is my first contribution to the ALSB as ALSA Director. USAF Col. Kenneth Murphy has moved on to be the commander of the 53 Test and Evaluation Group at Nellis AFB, Nevada. I look forward to the changes that this year will bring and I embrace the chance to take on all challenges that will come from those changes.

Bridging Service interoperability gaps means we at the ALSA Center must constantly look at lessons learned and requests from the field to improve our published products and develop new publications for the joint warfighter. For example, lessons learned from Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and the requests from all four Services and JFCOM, ALSA is currently working on a *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (MTTP) for Targeting for Time Sensitive Targets (TST)*. As a result of Operation NOBLE EAGLE, ALSA was asked to develop, produce, and publish *MTTP for Air Defense of the United States (ADUS)*.

There are also times when lessons learned and operational feedback from the field gives ALSA the indication that our publications are no longer necessary, relevant, or current, due to technology, systems, or new procedures. Such a situation has led ALSA to rescind on July 31 our *MTTP for Requesting Reconnaissance Information in a Joint Environment (RECCE-J)*, [FM 3-55.43 (2-40.4), MCRP 2-1D (2-11A), NDC TM 3-55.2, AFTTP(I) 3-2.13] dated January 1996.

The ALSA Center cannot create informative, up-to-date publications without subject matter experts from the field. ALSA typically holds joint working groups to develop or revise existing manuals and we rely heavily on subject matter experts to provide the tactical and technical content of our manuals. As a result of the recent conflicts, it is evident that we need to take advantage of the vast body of knowledge and information that reside in the field to quickly develop useful tactics, techniques, and procedures. ALSA joint working groups are normally convened from Tuesday through Friday of a given week. Our goal is to publish a draft for the subject matter experts to review after the first joint working group. Then, if a second joint

working group is necessary, we invite experts back with the goal of revising, editing, and adjudicating comments from the first draft. Our goal is to publish a final coordination draft for world wide review at the completion of the second joint working group. Our working group schedules can be found on our web site.

Without support from the field, we cannot effectively place multi-Service TTP in the field in a timely manner. The requirement for ALSA's products comes directly from the field. Even the articles in our Air Land Sea Bulletin (ALSB), which consist of concepts that you, the warfighter, submit, have spawned MTTP publications. As always we are looking for new and interesting topics for articles. Submit articles for the ALSB to the ALSA editor, Matt Weir, at [alsaeditor@langley.af.mil](mailto:alsaeditor@langley.af.mil) or mail them to the ALSA Center at 114 Andrews Street, Langley AFB 23665.

ALSA's web site provides a one-stop resource to current and developing ALSA products, upcoming projects, joint working groups, and ALSBs. You can access ALSA's web site through a .mil domain at <https://lad.dtic.mil/alsa>. We welcome any and all ideas on how we might continue our mission of, "meeting the immediate needs of the warfighter."



LAVERNE YOUNG, Colonel USA  
Director

The value of this publication is directly related to the quality of input received from our audience. If you don't see the topic that you need, *tell* us. Better yet, send the editor an article on a joint warfighting topic for publication in the bulletin. Some possible **HOT** topics are - *Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, new operational capabilities, and new challenges and solutions for close air support.*



## **J-FIRE CHANGES - JOINT ACTION STEERING COMMITTEE CALLS FOR EARLY REVISION**

by  
**LTC Michael Bray**  
**ALSA Action Officer**

Changes are coming to the ALSA Center's Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for the Joint Application of Firepower (J-FIRE).

The four Service doctrine chiefs, at the Joint Action Steering Committee meeting in November, directed an early revision of J-FIRE to align it with procedures found in "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS)" Joint Publication 3-09.3.

One issue, brought before the Joint Chiefs of Staff on July 21 for resolution, was the CAS

mandatory read back requirements. The JCS Tank resolved the issue by incorporating a "Mandatory read back of lines, 4, 6, and restrictions from the CAS 9-line brief for all three types of control."

Because of this change and other substantive changes, the ALSA Center will conduct an early revision of the J-FIRE manual. "We are pushing the revision forward by two years," said Maj. Brad "Slim" Pickens. "That way we can incorporate this decision, Joint Air Attack Team techniques, and other changes to J-FIRE."

Adding Joint Air Attack Team techniques to the J-FIRE manual brings all fire integration techniques into one handy, pocket size field reference.

## **JOINT WORKING GROUPS - THE KEY TO SUCCESS FOR THE ALSA PROCESS**

The key to success at the ALSA Center always has been, and always will be, the joint working group (JWG) process.

After researching each project and developing an outline for the publication, ALSA invites subject matter experts (SMEs) from the field to attend JWGs. There, these SMEs write the most complete, accurate Service publications available.

The next JWG, at ALSA, is scheduled for February 10-13, during the revision process of the Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS) publication.

This publication supports IADs planning, coordination, and employment for the component/functional commanders, joint force commander (JFC)/joint task force (JTF) staff planners, and those unit commanders participating in and providing assets to theater operations.

Additionally, it provides the warfighter and planner single-source reference for specific service air defense capabilities and limitations. Specific IADS architectures to define command

and control (C2) procedures and plans regarding the threat, systems, sensors, and processes should be detailed in documents derived from the respective theater operation plan (OPLAN)/operation plan in concept format (CONPLAN) and concept of operations (CONOPS).

The purpose of this document is to provide guidance for C2 specific planning, coordination, and employment of a IADS. It will facilitate decisions by highlighting issues to be considered by the JFC and the area air defense commander (AADC) when preparing for theater air defense operations as it relates to theater force protection. Although IADS as doctrine is currently under development, concepts and discussions in this publication will provide procedures that equip the warfighter with those tools necessary to support the JFC in building an effective IADS.

If you are interested in being part of a JWG or want to find out what JWGs are coming up, visit the ALSA Center web site at <https://lad.dtic.mil/alsa>, or call DSN 575-0902 or commercial (757) 225-0902.

# AIR DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES – NO LONGER AN EXTERNAL ONLY THREAT



## Cover Story

Staff Sgt Aaron D. Allmon II, USAF

by  
**LTC Douglas Sutton, USA**  
**LCDR Michael Schroeder, USN**  
**Air Land Sea Application Center**

Before September 11, 2001, the Commander of Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) was focused on protecting the United States against outside threats. It was believed that an air attack on the United States would come from outside US borders. On September 11, 2001 when terrorists struck the World Trade Center in New York, the Pentagon in D.C., and crashed an airliner into a Pennsylvania field, the commander shifted the air defense focus to include all external and internal threats.

In response to internal threats, Air Force and Air National Guard fighter squadrons established 24 hour air patrols over several major US cities. These sorties and many other missions were quickly encompassed into the operation known

today as Operation NOBLE EAGLE (ONE). Since September 11, NORAD has scrambled fighters more than 1,600 times in response to possible air threats. All total, when AWACS and air-to-air refueling tankers are added to the mix, the number of sorties flown in support of ONE exceeds 33,000. However, the ONE mission encompasses much more than just fighters AWACS, or air-to-air tankers. The US Army provides air defense in the form of ground based air defense systems and the US Navy is prepared to lend support in the form Aegis cruisers or E-2 Hawkeyes for early warning. All of which must be closely coordinated with the multitude of non-DOD agencies that also participate in air defense of the United States. While special instructions (SPINS) were provided, those who executed ONE on a day to day basis quickly recognized the need for a single overarching document to complement the SPINS.

The Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center's most recent multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures (MTTP) publication, *The Air Defense*

**A U.S. Air Force F-16CJ Fighting Falcon from the 20th Fighter Wing, Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina, flies over Washington D.C. during an Operation NOBLE EAGLE mission for North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).**



GARY ELL, USAF

**The NOBLE EAGLE mission encompasses much more than just fighters AWACS, or air-to-air tankers. Here, an MH-53, Air Force Special Operations helicopter from Hurlburt Field, Fla., flies to Manhattan from McGuire Air Force Base, N.J., on Sept. 13, 2001.**

*of the United States (ADUS)*, is the result of a need to consolidate lessons learned from ONE into a single-source document. This publication also ties together the many organizations (both DOD and non-DOD) assigned to the ONE mission.

The main purpose in developing this publication was to create a single source document for new planners and participants in the ADUS mission. For ADUS to succeed, full coordination between all component elements and governmental agencies is essential. The ADUS MTTP will help facilitate this coordination and de-conflict activities of DOD and non-DOD agencies. It is the first attempt to capture lessons learned since September 11 and turn them into usable tactics, techniques, and procedures.

The need for ADUS came from the July 2002 NORAD and the Continental United States Region (CONR) ONE lessons learned conference at Tyndall AFB, Florida. Conference attendees unanimously agreed that an urgent need existed for tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to address the ongoing air defense of the United States mission – specifically to capture the lessons learned and the coordination required among DOD and non-DOD organizations tasked to support or execute ADUS operations. The ONE area of operations has distinct characteristics and coupled with the number of players and agencies involved (military and civilian, federal and state) poses unique challenges in terms of air defense coordination. However, no one at CONR had experience in either pulling all of these seeming disparate organizations into



one room or in writing TTP. That was when ALSA entered into the picture.

In September 2002, the Commander of CONR formally requested that ALSA develop an MTTP manual to address joint integrated air defense of the homeland. In October 2002, a CONR representative briefed the four Service doctrine chiefs on the need for air defense MTTP. Some reservations initially existed among the doctrine chiefs as to whether or not ALSA was the right organization to develop such an MTTP. However, in March of 2003 the doctrine chiefs approved the project directing ALSA to begin development of the ADUS MTTP.

The Service doctrine chiefs all agreed that the ADUS MTTP would support joint planners, warfighters, and interagency personnel by providing general as well as specific information about the ADUS mission. The manual would provide a single-source reference to include information on flight operations, air defense sector operations, special missions, command and control architecture, communications, airspace control measures, interagency coordination considerations, integration of air defense assets, and a wide range of operational considerations. The MTTP would also provide CONUS and Alaska mission-specific TTPs, focus on known capabilities, and include lessons learned. The publication would not, however, address ballistic or cruise missile defense operations, contain policy, direct allocation or apportionment of forces. These subjects were not addressed in the first version in order to narrow the scope and to get a product out to the field as quickly as possible.

To develop the publication, ALSA hosted the first of two joint, interagency working groups (JIWG) in April 2003, where 42 subject matter experts (SME) worked to develop the ADUS first draft. In addition to ALSA's normal attendance from Service SMEs, a large representation from non-DOD agencies involved in the air defense mission participated as well; a first for any ALSA MTTP. The non-DOD participants included representatives from Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Immigrations and Customs

Enforcement (ICE), US Secret Service (USSS), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), United States Coast Guard (USCG) and the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI).

The SMEs returned in June 2003 to finalize the draft and prepare it for world wide review. The world wide review generated more than 300 comments that ALSA's Team E adjudicated and used to prepare the final draft for approval by the Service doctrine chiefs. Having the non-DOD representatives in attendance added tremendous value to the overall publication. The working groups provided an excellent forum for many issues to be resolved such as DOD and non-DOD handoff procedures while prosecuting tracks of interest.

The final 140-page SECRET/REL CAN document that was developed gives the reader a tremendous wealth of information regarding all of the ONE participants, their capabilities, and how they fit into the overall mission. Planners can use the aircraft capabilities tables to determine the best way to employ both DOD and non-DOD assets. Newly assigned units will find the intelligence chapter serves as an excellent primer about the potential threats faced by the ONE participants. In addition, the descriptions of the command and control hierarchy from the air operations centers to how the US Army air defense batteries are organized – will give these units a greater understanding of how they will fit in the overall ONE mission and who they will be working with.

We, at ALSA, would like to thank all the personnel who worked on this project. From CONR who championed this project from the very beginning; all those who attended the working groups; and finally to those who were there in the final stages of editing to answer our questions and help clarify issues. Without their effort, time, and commitment ALSA would never have been able to deliver such a relevant and useful publication like the ADUS MTTP to the warfighter in a timely manner.

The ALSA Center's Air Defense of the US publication is classified SECRET, releasable to Canada. It can be viewed at <http://wwwacc.langleysmil.mil/alsa>

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
**“... There is an overriding and urgent mission here in America today, and that’s to protect our homeland. We have been called into action, and we’ve got to act.”**

**President  
George W. Bush  
10 July 2002**

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# INFORMATION OPERATIONS - IO IN SUPPORT OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS



**Figure 1:**  
**Five IO core capabilities - PSYOP, MILDEC, OPSEC, EW and CNO; supporting capabilities and related capabilities.**

by  
**Major Bradley Bloom, USA**

The capabilities grouped under Information Operations (IO), when properly coordinated and employed can promote conservation of limited SOF resources, reduce operational risk and significantly enhance the accomplishment of Special Operations missions. The increase in Special Operations OPTEMPO and employment demands since 9-11 and emerging USSOCOM Combatant Command roles have added considerable impetus to the need for immediate and routine application of IO capabilities in support of special operators. While there are numerous examples of SOF units employing the capabilities of IO with notable success, particularly in Afghanistan and Iraq, IO still lack a broader acceptance and common application in Special Operations staff organization, planning and execution: particularly at the tactical level. The key to developing a truly effective Special Operations IO capability is the clarification of organizational requirements and responsibilities, the development of standardized planning capabilities and related manning, and the institutionalization of this process across operational HQs.

Because of ongoing developments in doctrine and tactical application, it is useful to review the most current definitions and conceptual framework of IO prior to continuing. DoD

Directive 3600.1 Version Six (DRAFT) provides an effective IO summary. Although this document is in draft form, it is a commonly used reference in DoD messages and doctrinal working groups. The directive defines IO as: "Actions taken to influence, affect or defend information, information systems and decision-making."

Directive 3600.1 further goes on to identify five IO core capabilities: Psychological Operations (PSYOP), Military Deception (MILDEC), Operational Security (OPSEC), Electronic Warfare (EW) and Computer Network Operations (CNO). IO supporting capabilities are Intelligence and Counter Intelligence (CI), Kinetic Attack, Physical Security and Information Assurance. Public Affairs and Civil Military Operations are identified IO related capabilities. Figure 1 shows these capabilities in a relational framework.

In its broadest context, IO facilitates or enhances Special Operations mission accomplishment throughout the operational spectrum from strategic down to tactical levels. At the strategic level, IO support to Special Operations may include such things as mission focused supporting actions by other government agencies, policy statements, broader regional engagement programs and IO capability support from coalition partners. As a component of a larger joint force, the JSOTF can also benefit from the results of the theater IO campaign and the secondary effects of friendly operations on enemy forces and civilians in the joint special operations area (JSOA). These events can significantly shape the SOF operational environment, and when properly leveraged contribute to the accomplishment of the commander's objectives.

IO provides perhaps its most tangible benefit to Special Operations at the tactical end of the spectrum where boots meet terrain. As an example, Figure 2 illustrates the role that tactical level IO capabilities can play in the consecutive phases of a notional Direct Action mission. To highlight key contributions: activities such as OPSEC, Deception and Information Assurance support Special Operations planning and mission preparation by protecting the purpose, scope, timing and location of the operation and operational forces. PSYOP can be used to condition the adversary, weakening his morale, and promoting the inevitability of defeat. During


actions on the objective, EW and CNO can be critical to isolating the objective from outside communication and blocking warning or reinforcement calls while tactical PSYOP forces deter civilian interference. Following the operation, PSYOP and PA can exploit mission success to increase popular support for US objectives and forces, thus reducing the adversary's freedom of operation in the future. The ultimate goal of the planning process is the integration of IO tasks on the mission synchronization matrix that reflect a specific friendly IO system or action (for example EC-130, EA-6B, PSYOP Broadcast or leaflet drop, deception activity or INFOCON status change), the purpose of the action, target location, duration and the anticipated IO effect related to other mission activities, decision points, timelines and overall success criteria.

While there are strategic, Joint Force HQ and tactical IO activities that support Special Operations, there are significant challenges to planning and synchronizing actions in support of SO at these levels. At the strategic level, IO is conducted by a diffuse structure of national agencies and policy-making systems, all of which are encumbered with issues of global strategy and individual departmental priorities. Strategic level organizations seldom coalesce beyond a loosely constructed framework to produce a detailed engagement plan that adequately focuses on the needs of the operational military commander.

Higher conventional Joint Force HQs IO is generally allocated in support of broader theater objectives and the dominant fire and maneuver components. Likewise, theater level IO staff planners often lack special operations expertise to provide focused IO support to the JSOTF or Combined Force Special Operations Command (CFSOC).

At the tactical level, troop units are challenged by limited staff size and deployment footprint as well as access to and familiarity with the full spectrum of available IO tools. Leaders and staff officers simply “do not know what they do not know” with regards to IO capabilities. Tactical issues of manning and limited inherent IO capability are often magnified when maintaining a small SO footprint or conducting operations over a large geographic area. Finally, tactical unit resources and focus by nature and risk remain centered on Mission Essential Task Lists (METL) generally associated with kinetic operations.

The challenges listed above, as well as broader IO planning considerations and division of responsibilities shown in Figure 3 cause the operational level SOF HQ to emerge as the key node in IO planning and fusion. In the areas




assigned to a Geographic Combatant Commander, the TSOC is the likely candidate to integrate IO in support of SO.

In peacetime and during the development of Theater Security and Cooperation Plans, the responsibility for Special Operations planning and OPCON of deployed forces rests with the TSOC. In a larger contingency, the TSOC may serve under a designated JTF as the HQ element of a JSOTF or may fill a more complex role as a CFSOC with multiple subordinate JSOTFs, both US and coalition. Whatever operational level function the TSOC fills, the permanent addition of trained IO planners and processes is critical to maximizing the overall contributions of IO. The responsibility and requirements for operational level IO planning and execution are largely derived from the mission scope and task organization of the joint force. The scope of involvement becomes one of defining specific operational requirements, appropriate manning (permanent and augmented) to meet those requirements, and the appropriate staff organization to smoothly coordinate action.

In peacetime, operational requirements in the TSOC are derived from the Theater Security and Cooperation Plan, generating or revising CONPLANs and OPLANs, and providing required input to higher HQ force development initiatives. Although not all IO capabilities are routinely employed in peacetime, the requirement to develop or revise standing CONPLANs and OPLANs would be more thoroughly met if addressed by permanently assigned IO expertise in each of the core capabilities.

Besides enhancing the quality and completeness of planning, establishing and filling core IO billets in peacetime breeds a familiarity

**Figure 2:**  
**Illustrating the**  
**role that tactical**  
**level IO**  
**capabilities can**  
**play in the**  
**consecutive**  
**phases of a**  
**notional Direct**  
**Action mission.**



**Figure 3:**  
IO planning considerations and division of responsibilities cause the operational level SOF HQ to emerge as the key node in IO planning and fusion. In the areas assigned to a Geographic Combatant Commander, the TSOC is the likely candidate to integrate IO in support of SO.

of personalities and procedures that rapidly transitions to enhanced performance in wartime, and avoids a dependence on joint manning documents (JMD) fill with personnel of varying experience and capabilities. Finally, if an outside HQ such as a Army Special Forces Group or Naval Special Warfare Task Group stands up as the core element of a stand alone JSOTF in theater, the TSOC would possess a resident, theater specific IO planning cell that is capable of physically or virtually augmenting the JSOTF capabilities while the JSOTF awaits their own JMD fill. (This "push" capability is currently resident as a Special Operations IO Support Team from the USSTRATCOM Joint Information Operations Center, but there is only one "fire-team" available).

The ability to generate and fill new positions within operational staffs and units is generally a zero sum gain for the larger SOF community or individual military service. Therefore, it is critical to strike a balance enhancing Special Operations IO capability without degrading other capabilities. At the TSOC level, peacetime requirements could be met with a small IO cell under the supervision of a Deputy J3 for IO consisting of personnel with PSYOP, EW, CNO and Intelligence (analysis) expertise. Although not a core IO capability, the skill set for gathering and analyzing IO relevant intelligence data requires additional training and familiarity beyond a traditional "synthesized intelligence" focus. The DJ3 for IO also serves as a core member of the TSOC J3 Joint Planning Group (JPG), augmenting his capabilities with his subordinate functional experts when needed.

External to J3 IO, core capability OPSEC and deception expertise could be drawn as needed

from other staff sections in peacetime. As an economy of manning initiative, the command OPSEC position could be filled by a currently assigned J2 CI billet and augmented by the assignment of section OPSEC / Information Assurance Officers or NCOs with the requisite functional training and SOPs. A J35 or J5 planner with a secondary expertise and education could meet peacetime deception planning requirements.

There are additional requirements for PSYOP and CA (an IO related capability) personnel within the TSOC for other functions beyond SOIO planning. Under the Unified Command Plan, PSYOP and Civil Affairs (CA) are designated as SOF components, and therefore subject to TSOC OPCON and theater coordination (in the absence of a standing JTF, JCMOTF or JPOTF) in the same manner as other service SOF. This generates a requirement external to the SOIO cell for the allocation of permanent PSYOP and CA billets not only in the TSOC J5 (Plans) section, but also in J3 (Ops) to meet specific theater driven requirements.

For planning and coordination purposes, the Deputy J3 for IO in a TSOC should have a designated TO&E point of interface in each force providing unit down to the Group / Squadron / Naval Special Warfare Task Group (NSWTG) level. This POC should have a broad based knowledge of the capabilities and role of IO in support of SOF, and would ideally be a functionally designated and trained IO planner for their service component.<sup>1</sup> Initiatives are currently under discussion in most Services to place a permanent IO planner at this level.

The functions of a TSOC are substantially expanded by contingency operations in which the TSOC forms the core of a JSOTF or CFSOC. In addition to sustaining peacetime responsibilities and maintaining broader theater situational awareness, the TSOC is now also responsible for OPCON of subordinate elements as part of a broader operational plan, battle tracking, operational level SO feasibility assessments, preliminary mission analysis, subordinate mission tasking, development of orders and annexes, dissemination of commander's guidance, subordinate CONPLAN review and approval processes, vertical and horizontal liaison, deconfliction and review of supporting plans, participation in the targeting process, combat assessment and feedback, revising future operations and developing future plans. All of these additional tasks apply not only to traditional elements of SOF combat power, but also to Special Operations IO. Although the end product will often be a "layering effect" of IO



capabilities in support of subordinate operations, in some cases, planners may devise an operation designed to achieve a non-lethal or psychological effect that is supported by other SOF core mission profiles. This in turn will be integrated into the broader JTF or theater IO plan.

In order to meet the substantial expansion of responsibilities in a contingency, the TSOC (JSOTF / CFSOCC) requires a corresponding increase in IO manning. Other situation-unique factors such as the operational scenario (geo-spatial, political environment and ROE), enemy capabilities (C4I structure, weapon systems) and the composition of friendly forces (JTF with corresponding major subordinate commands (MSCs), number of subordinate JSOTFs, coalition partners, higher HQ battle rhythm) determine IO needs beyond a standard “doubling” of peacetime manpower to meet shift requirements. These requirements will generally be met through JMD fills or a Request For Forces from service component IO capabilities.

As far as contingency integration of the IO cell, there are many options. However, the most efficient seems to be a transition from a centralized cell operating under the DJ3 IO in peacetime to a distributed execution process that expands IO manning from a centralized IO cell to current operations (JOC floor), J2 analysis, the J3/J5 plans section, the Joint Fires Element and the Special Plans Group (SPG) during contingencies.

Under this option, once a set level of capabilities and manning is reached through augmentation, the J3 IO section disperses key personnel to the other staff sections mentioned above to man permanent workspaces in those sections. The DJ3 for IO is responsible to make recommendations and adjustments to the placement of his personnel as the operational environment and manning level dictates. The remaining members of the centralized J3 IO cell would maintain responsibility for peacetime requirements, theater level operational oversight, and overall responsibility for integrating and deconflicting mission specific Special Operations IO actions and effects with the larger operational IO plan. Although the DJ3 for IO is suited by training and background to fill a Deputy Chief of Plans billet, this temptation should be avoided. The assignment to another primary duty would detract from his ability to synchronize and

deconflict the larger IO picture or add his own influence to short suspense issues in a complex operational environment.

Because of the demands already levied on IO force providers by higher headquarters, tactical units will have a difficult time filling a robust IO JMD in a manner similar to the TSOC/CFSOCC/CJSOTF. As with the TSOC, mission parameters will dictate what IO planning skills are essential for tactical mission accomplishment. To offset unit shortages, service component SOF forces have the ability to request IO support teams from service specific IO commands<sup>2</sup>.

At levels subordinate to the CFSOC or JSOTF, the IO planner’s primary responsibilities are mission analysis to identify desired IO effects, tentative support and targeting requirements, COA refinement, and providing IO subject matter expertise to the commander. Their initial product to the JSOTF or CFSOC HQ is an IO support request that will be further developed into specific actions and asset allocations by the CFSOC/JSOTF IO planners. Once the JSOTF/CFSOC IO cell allocates available resources, the subordinate SOF IO cell integrates those resources into the tactical unit synchronization matrix. The critical interaction between IO cells that this requires is dependent on adequate command emphasis, training, collaborative tools and liaison.

We must move forward to maximize the assets and capabilities that IO provides in support of Special Operations. The challenges of today’s operational environment cannot be met by a continued focus on action-less doctrinal debate or the ad-hoc maintenance of a temporary or second tier staff element. This paper has provided a basic overview of the importance of IO in support of Special Operations, recommendations and insights for Special Operations IO manning, and staff organization considerations for peacetime and contingency operations. One may debate the applicability of these suggestions, and each of you is encouraged to engage your own chain of command on the best solution for your organization’s unique situational challenges and requirements. The critical issue is the rapid establishment of a long-term framework that facilitates the focused and coordinated application of Special Operations IO capabilities in a manner that not only enhances SOF mission accomplishment but also reduces risk to special operators.

#### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Ideally, this would be an O-5/O-4 staff position filled by a broad based IO integrator function such as a US Army FA 30.

<sup>2</sup> US Army: 1<sup>st</sup> Information Operations Command, Land (formerly LIWA), US Navy: Fleet Information Warfare Center, USAF: Air Force Information Warfare Center.

## JOINT PERSONNEL RECOVERY COORDINATION CENTER – THE NEXT EVOLUTION IN JOINT INTEGRATION

Personnel recovery has drastically improved in the last 15 years, making it “one of highest priorities of the Department of Defense.”<sup>2</sup>

The next step is to create a new entity in their staff—the Joint Personnel Recovery Coordination Center (JPRCC)<sup>3</sup>.



by  
**Maj Eric Braganca, USAF**  
**SOCJFCOM/J-732**

Personnel recovery (PR)<sup>1</sup> has improved dramatically in the last fifteen years. At every level of the Department of Defense, PR is a priority mission, reflecting the high value American warriors place on our fellow soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines. Each Service has devoted personnel, thought, and resources to this critical mission area to improve the joint force's overall capability and interoperability. Especially in the years since Desert Storm, the military has purchased better radios, more sophisticated surveillance and reconnaissance equipment, and improved training; all this with an eye to their impact on "one of highest priorities of the Department of Defense."<sup>2</sup> The success of this approach has saved lives on the battlefields since the 1991 war with Iraq—from the high profile rescues of downed F-117 and F-16 pilots over Serbia to the less renown, but more numerous missions in Afghanistan and now even the high-profile POW rescue in Iraq. The collective efforts have yielded tremendous successes. We are, however, obligated to look into the future to develop new methods and envision tomorrow's battlefield which may entail even more PR.

Improving our PR capability requires commanders to understand the tasks involved, delegate those tasks appropriately, and leverage the personal and organizational creativity latent in the force to accomplish them in the most effective and efficient way possible. Of course, changes must demonstrate significant improvement while maintaining current successes, all while remaining financially realistic.

#### **Proposal**

Joint force commanders (JFCs) should create a new entity in their staff—the Joint Personnel Recovery Coordination Center (JPRCC)<sup>3</sup>—replacing the Joint Search and Rescue Center (JSRC)—to function in new ways to improve PR integration. By working for the JFC, the JPRCC will have better focus on operational warfare.<sup>4</sup> It will also better focus the components on tactical PR efforts, particularly the air component, and open up new possibilities for better joint integration, especially by using more flexible command relationships. None of these improvements will come at the expense of recent improvements, so there is no trade-off or lesser-of-evils.

Current joint doctrine offers JFCs the option to retain the JSRC at his headquarters or delegate it to a component commander.<sup>5</sup> In practice, JFCs

have routinely chosen to delegate this responsibility to their air component. However, this trend is changing<sup>6</sup> and this change—to retain the JSRC at the JFC-level—is a positive change with the potential to dramatically improve PR by better monitoring and coordinating all means of recovery, both Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) and others such as non-conventional assisted recovery (NAR). This new location is designed to help view PR more holistically and has spawned the new name, Joint Personnel Recovery Coordination Center (JPRCC) versus JSRC, to indicate a broader view of the mission. This, too, is a positive, required change to indicate the new role that this new body will accomplish—less tactical control and more operational integration. The new joint PR doctrine (currently in draft) should change this to make the JPRCC part of the JFC's staff and delineate the risks associated with delegating this to a component<sup>7</sup>.

This change will not decrease current tactical successes, but will open up new avenues for operational integration. Creating a JPRCC at the JFC's headquarters will significantly broaden PR options without slowing responsiveness or agility by retaining traditional CSAR activities at the component level such as the JFACC Rescue Coordination Center (RCC). It will retain current successes and simultaneously increase joint awareness and involvement in PR.

A new JPRCC will not require significant funding, nor will it significantly increase the personnel for the JFC or the components. While the JFC's headquarters will require an increase in personnel,<sup>8</sup> the warfighting components will continue to function as they have, so they will retain the vast majority of their manning. More importantly, this new concept will not alter the PR/CSAR<sup>9</sup> TTP for any service. This change will require some new approaches to operational thinking—demand which the small groups of military PR schools can meet. PR events are already included in most Joint Chiefs of Staff and theater exercises so this idea can be routinely practiced as well.<sup>10</sup>

#### **Improved Operational Focus**

The JSRC, routinely delegated to the JFACC, has become the focal point for all PR efforts. Its doctrinal charter is "to plan, coordinate, and execute joint search and rescue (SAR) and CSAR operations; and to integrate CSAR operations with other evasion, escape and recovery operations within the geographic area assigned to the joint force."<sup>11</sup> However, because the JSRC combines the JFACC's RCC tactical focus and the JFC's operational focus, its efforts are divided between





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tactical execution and operational planning. This dual-hatted nature has forced JSRCs to concentrate on essential tactical tasks and accept risk by losing focus on other means of recovery. Current JSRCs at JFACC level focus their efforts on developing and publishing SPINs, communicating with components, as well as monitoring and (frequently) directing PR incidents. Maintaining control over PR tactical operations—a requirement of being a component RCC—hampers JSRCs. A JPRCC will unleash new potential by: developing PR-specific joint intelligence preparation of the battlefield (JIPB) allowing the JPRCC to generate a broad threat decision matrix; integrating PR themes into the JFC's psychological operations; including nontraditional military forces in planning; improving the links to interagency and non-conventional forces; and harnessing more flexible command relationships. JPRCCs, relieved of the RCC responsibility of controlling tactical operations (retained by component commanders), could concentrate more effectively on these operational links which can significantly improve our PR efforts by more effectively leveraging national power for this high-priority mission.

PR planners have struggled with how to recommend when and how to execute PR missions. One of the current JSRC Combat


Operations tasks<sup>12</sup> designed to make this easier is a PR Decision Matrix, tailored to the current threat, to aid PR decision-makers. JSRCs typically have no planners since they are usually located in the Air Operation Center Combat Operations section and are prepared to tactically control a PR mission. With no ability to look beyond the current air tasking orders (ATOs) due to the numerous requirements of attending short-range planning meetings, JSRCs are forced to focus on the current fight. A JPRCC will more readily focus beyond the next few days into longer-term issues.

Psychological operations (PSYOPs), and information operations (IO) as a whole, allow warfighters to influence enemy forces and populations about friendly actions. This is particularly important to PR missions where isolated or distressed persons evade in enemy or neutral territory. PSYOPs can convince people in these areas not to interfere in recovery missions. Given favorable circumstances, PSYOPs may be able to convince neutral people to assist isolated personnel and return them to friendly control. The growing world of information operations offers even greater opportunities to impact PR. Operational PSYOPs themes are usually developed and/or approved by the JFC—a JPRCC closer to this planning process will have a greater

ability to harness the power of this non-kinetic firepower to improve PR effectiveness. Integrating PSYOPs into a comprehensive PR plan requires time—time that tactically-focused JSRCs don't have.

Integration with nontraditional military forces, such as Civil Affairs (CA)<sup>13</sup>, could also increase our PR efforts. While many view CA as those who enter a fight when the fighting is done to build bridges, repair infrastructure, and coordinate humanitarian relief operations, the modern truth is much different. Increasingly, CA operate side-by-side with combat forces as decisive operations and nation-building phases merge. Central Command introduced CA in Afghanistan, and now Iraq, long before combat operations were over; US forces are simultaneously conducting nation-building and antiterrorist operations. These CA gain local knowledge in their day-to-day dealings with the population and can provide key insights for PR planners and executors. CA also have routine contact with many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) which further broadens their knowledge-base. While it's unrealistic for these forces to actively participate in combat rescue efforts, they provide valuable insights guiding a JPRCC's threat assessment or evasion guidance. Afghanistan and Iraq aside, not all military operations are combat operations. Frequently, US forces provide humanitarian relief in areas overwhelmed by natural disasters or internal strife, as happened numerous times in Africa in the late 1990s (Rwanda and Mozambique for example). This change offers the JPRCC opportunities beyond the links to military forces.

A JFC headquarters has many boards, bureaus, cells, and offices<sup>14</sup> (BBCOs) which fuse various elements of national power. These BBCOs frequently are the first place where diplomatic, information, and economic expertise mix with military forces to achieve strategic or campaign goals. An operationally focused JPRCC will easily tap into these rich sources of information to provide the warfighters with more tools and options for the entire force. Since PR includes concerns over POWs, having access to an Inter-Agency Working Group (IAWG) will provide access to the diplomatic arm of US power to highlight the need to account and care for US/allied POW/MIAs. The Joint Staff frequently deploys National Intelligence Support Teams (NIST)<sup>15</sup> to JFC headquarters to assist in harnessing the vast intelligence capability of all the various intelligence agencies. Just as with the IAWG, a JPRCC above the components will have ready access to these teams and be better



able to leverage its power.

A JPRCC at the JFC headquarters will have easy access to all these elements of power and the perspective, relieved of the tactical concerns, to use them.

#### Better Tactical Focus

JFACC staffs will similarly find the change an improvement over the current method. As already mentioned, JFACC staffs struggle with dual tasking as the component RCC and a joint operations area (JOA)-wide<sup>16</sup> operational JSRC. This situation works due to the incredible effort by the dedicated men and women who man these staffs. We no longer have to require so much work from so few people or rely on the good graces which have recently made our PR efforts so successful, especially when the price of greater capability is so low.

In the years preceding and immediately after Desert Storm, PR predominantly meant rescuing downed aircrew (CSAR to most people). Using this thought, it made great sense to place the JSRC at the air component. However, in recent conflicts, new realities have emerged where ground troops operating in rear areas or border guards on a peacekeeping mission, for example, are vulnerable. CSAR procedures, designed and

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### Spt'd Cdr sets

- Timing/Tempo
- Priorities
- Effects

### Spt'g Cdrs—synchronize efforts to meet Spt'd Cdr's needs consistent with other operations

#### JFACC ISR & AWACS



#### JFMCC Recovery Helos



#### JFLCC Armored Recon



#### JSOTF SEAL Platoon



**By creating a JPRCC and eliminating any tactical role, the future of PR might look like this: the air component providing ISR and AWACS with JSTARS and E-3s, the land component providing a ground armored reconnaissance element, the maritime component providing the recovery vehicle with HH-60s, and the special ops component providing a SEAL team moving the survivor to a link-up point.**

tested for and by aviators, do not always work. Ground forces face different realities such as phase lines and surface boundaries which airmen have difficulty understanding. JSRCs, used to transmitting information rapidly via the SIPRNET to secure airbases to airmen with a common vision of the battlespace, now struggle to understand land warfare where infantrymen patrol. A JPRCC, with representation from all the components,<sup>17</sup> is better suited to make procedures for the entire joint force. This will allow the JFACC to concentrate on PR for airmen and not on the unfamiliar field of land warfare.

Current staffs struggle with many of the less-obvious tasks involved in PR. Repatriation is routinely overlooked. What to do with a survivor once friendly forces regain control has always been a thorny issue with few easy answers. When the survivor is an air component pilot, the answer is easy because the JFACC's RCC/JSRC has complete control over the repatriation process as well as the survivor. However, when the survivor is from another component, such as the three Army soldiers captured in Kosovo in 1999, the situation is much more difficult. Under a JPRCC, the JFACC will no longer be responsible for enforcing policies on a sister component. Likewise, the other components will view PR as part of their joint responsibilities and no longer solely as their contribution to the JFACC's process. If the JFC owns the process (created with input from all components) through his JPRCC, then no component can circumvent it.

One reason this change will be transparent to most warfighters is the shift in responsibility required by this approach. The JPRCC will not be a command and control element. Instead, the

JPRCCs will plan and integrate the joint force, leaving the tactical tasks to the warfighting components. During a PR event, the JPRCC will monitor to maintain situation awareness in the event the affected component requires assistance or is incapable of performing the PR tasks required. In such a case, the JPRCC—acting as the JFC's agent and with his guidance—will act as the broker for the components, nominating a supported component and, with JFC approval, designating other components to support. The tactical control of the PR event will remain with the warfighting component, as it is now. This will retain the current successes and, by limiting the JPRCC's role in tactical operations, prevent undue influence on service-specific TTP. This offers a win-win scenario for JFACC staffs—the JFACC retains his air component RCC while relieving him of the responsibility to integrate all the other elements of military power not directly related to airpower. There are, however, greater advantages to creating the JPRCC.

### Better Joint Force Integration

The single greatest improvement from such a move is the ability to use more flexible command relationships. Currently, most JSRCs assume tactical control (TACON)<sup>18</sup> of any elements conducting PR missions. While this relationship has worked for air-dominant PR, the TACON relationship is usually not clearly defined (when does it begin and end?) and other component commanders have been highly reluctant to handover control of their assets to the JSRC when their components have their own warfighting missions to accomplish and fear being forced to use another component's TTP. TACON also creates more problems when trying to fuse warfare across mediums—land, air, and sea. Creating a JPRCC at the JFC headquarters and using the more flexible command relationship of “support”<sup>19</sup> could eliminate both of these concerns.

For more than ten years, JFACCs have taken TACON of the other components' air sorties to incorporate them into a seamless air campaign. This works because JFACC staffs have great capacity to integrate those other components' airpower. JSRCs have translated this concept to PR because PR has frequently meant the recovery of downed pilots solely using airpower. Since those downed pilots belonged to the JFACC, TACON was the right command relationship. Recent contingencies have challenged this paradigm and opened gaps in the TACON approach. For example, the number and reach of special operations forces introduces a more complex battlefield with small teams throughout



the battlefield with unique PR challenges and requirements. A special operations commander with a team in distress should be able to tap into the JSRC for expertise without automatically passing control of the mission to another component. When a JFACC pilot is the survivor, the JFACC commands the survivor who is unfamiliar with his environment and requires detailed direction for recovery. A SOF team has dramatically greater situational awareness of its environment and capability to make decisions favorable to its recovery. A SOF commander may require limited assistance to recover his team—CAS, ISR—but has frequently been forced to pass control of his force (air and ground) to leverage the support of another component. While this hasn't caused mission failure in recent years, this friction has significantly delayed missions<sup>20</sup> while the special operations component and JSRC resolved the issues. This friction will be eliminated by a JPRCC designating one of the components as the supported command and the others as the supporting commands. Regardless of which one was supported, none will lose tactical control of their assets. The supported commander will dictate the priority, timing, and effects while the supporting commander retains control of his TTP to accomplish the mission.

This principle's greatest test comes as conventional forces operate in less linear ways. Using the Joint Forces Command experiment Millennium Challenge 02 as an example, conventional forces lept over pockets of resistance to attack key nodes required to achieve the desired effects.<sup>21</sup> This created a nonlinear battlefield with pockets of friendly forces—similar to the fight in Afghanistan and Iraq today. An air component JSRC trying to assume TACON of non-JFACC forces for PR is frequently unaware of the overall campaign and the impact taking TACON of some elements will have on the surface fight<sup>22</sup>.

Commanders are reluctant to pass TACON to other components because other components do not understand those forces. Air Force and Navy airpower is typically under the control of a single airman to exploit its similarities. Army and Marine Corps ground power is frequently under the control of a single ground commander to synchronize their operations. These forces are able to conduct air-ground operations without passing TACON between the air and ground components because they recognize their common efforts and their dissimilar abilities. CAS is a great example of this. Air commanders provide CAS to ground commanders to assist

them achieve ground objectives without passing TACON of the aircraft. Air commanders develop specialized command and control elements to provide this support while retaining control of their assets. This works since ground commanders have little or no ability to control airpower. This same thinking should be applied to PR.

Changing PR command and control to “support” will be a shift in favor of the rest of joint warfighting. This may seem like a radical change, but this really is the broader joint approach. A JPRCC above the components will be able to effectively use this technique, as delegated by the JFC, because of their ability to view the broader implications of joint warfare. It is this ability to improve the command and control of PR that offers the greatest potential to increase our capability without any additional forces or cost. Simply allowing other component commanders to retain control of their assets while controlling or assisting PR operations will dramatically increase their willingness to participate.

#### **The Cost of Training**

The cost of this improvement in capability—battlestaff training. JFCs and components commanders must incorporate this shift into their battlestaff training. Since these are recurring events, both within the services and jointly, there's little financial cost to this. This change will not levee any new training requirements or tactical training and, hopefully, this will improve the quality of PR training. All that's needed is a mental shift to align more closely with the rest of joint warfighting.

#### **Conclusion**

PR must remain a high priority mission for Americans because of our values. This isn't a US military theme, but an American theme which we share with many of our allies. So the challenge for PR planners and operators is to create a system which harnesses the massive talents of our military without setting aside so much power to impede the primary mission, whatever that might be. Creating a JPRCC at the JFC's headquarters will do this more effectively.

The JPRCC at the JFC's headquarters will better focus on the core functions of integration. It will be relieved of the necessity of tactical operations—true for all BBCOs—allowing it to concentrate on operational issues such as a PR-specific JIPB including both ground and airpower. A JFC-level JPRCC will be better positioned to integrate with non-conventional elements of US power such as PSYOPS, CA (where appropriate), and interagency groups. And since a JPRCC will

not be assuming control of tactical operations, the warfighting components will not lose any control over their own forces or TTPs which will retain all the advantages of recent successes. Without adding funding or forces, PR will have added perspective and reach on the joint battlefield. But the greatest improvement is the shift toward true joint warfighting.

Using more flexible and responsive command relationships will better integrate the components toward a truly joint PR operation. Many components fear the loss of control and capability when the only option offered is to pass TACON of key assets to another component. By creating a JPRCC and eliminating any tactical role, the future of PR might look like this: the air component providing ISR and AWACS with JSTARS and E-3s, the land component providing a ground armored reconnaissance element, the maritime component providing the recovery vehicle with HH-60s, and the special ops component providing a SEAL team moving the

survivor to a link-up point. The JPRCC's role in such a mission will simply be to designate the supported component then monitor operations. While this is an extreme possibility, it highlights the potential interaction possible when command relationships cease to become impediments to PR operations. This will only be possible when the JPRCC is no longer a warfighter and becomes a facilitator. Today's fluid battlefield with linear and nonlinear warfare intermixed require more agile responses. Moving the JPRCC away from the warfighting components offers just such agility. Many good men and women have struggled for years to improve PR and bring us the successes we've seen over the last few years. This change will capture their hard work and excellent results. It will also offer greater opportunities for more innovation and improvements to make sure every American goes into combat knowing their nation and its forces will do everything possible to bring them home alive no matter what their situation.

#### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> JP 1-02 definition—the aggregation of military, civil, and political efforts to obtain the release or recovery of personnel from uncertain or hostile environments and denied areas whether captured, missing, or isolated. That includes US, allied, coalition, friendly military, or paramilitary, and others designated by the National Command Authorities. PR is the umbrella term for operations that are focused on the task of recovering captured, missing, or isolated personnel from harm's way. PR includes, but is not limited to, theater search and rescue; combat rescue and rescue; search and rescue; survival, evasion, resistance, and escape; evasion and escape; and the coordination of negotiated as well as forcible recovery options. PR can occur through military action, action by non-governmental organizations, other US Government approved action, and/or diplomatic initiatives, or through any of these.

<sup>2</sup> DODD 2310.2, Personnel Recovery, Dec 2000, para 4.1.

<sup>3</sup> The new term proposed for the next

version of JP 3-50.2, Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Recovery (now in Final Coordination) is Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC). This acronym conflicts with the existing Joint Personnel Reception Center, so I've altered the term to be unique and avoid greater confusion. JPRCC is a more accurate name and should become the standard term—I will use to help indicate this new role, distinct from the one most people associate with the current JSRC model.

<sup>4</sup> JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, describes operational warfare as the level linking tactics to strategic objectives and focusing on the operational art (p II-2).

<sup>5</sup> JP 3-50.2, p III-1.

<sup>6</sup> European Command has created a Joint Personnel Recovery Coordination Cell at its Standing Joint Force Headquarters. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) has moved the JSRC function from its air component to the SOUTHCOM headquarters.

<sup>7</sup> JFCs always have the option of altering their force and staff structure, however. JP 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance

and Procedures (Jan 99).

<sup>8</sup> JP 3-50.2, Chap VI, lists the doctrinal JSRC requirement (15 personnel in 3 shifts); in practice, each JSRC is task-organized in line with METT-T considerations. Therefore it's not realistic to precisely predict the number of personnel required for this new JPRCC, however the additional manning will most likely not be significant.

<sup>9</sup> There are significant differences in the meanings of Personnel Recovery and Combat Search and Rescue. PR covers the theater or JOA-wide holistic mission while CSAR revolves around the combat tactical task performed by designated rescue forces. Since CSAR is a subset of PR, I will use *PR* as the broader, more-appropriate umbrella term.

<sup>10</sup> PR exercises are either stand-alone service events or are additions to existing JCS or theater exercises. In the latter case, they are usually minor events which could greatly improve by creating the JPRCC on the JFC staff.

<sup>11</sup> JP 3-50.2. para 2b.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.* Ch I, para 3b.

<sup>13</sup> According to US Special Operations Command, "Civil Affairs" are the forces and "civil affairs operations" is the mission.

<sup>14</sup> BBCOs are staff elements of a JFCs headquarters focused on a specific facet of the operation such the Joint Movement Center, Joint Information Bureau, and Joint Targeting Coordination Board. JP 5-00. lists more.

<sup>15</sup> NIST—usually has elements from various US intelligence agencies such as Defense Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, National Imagery and Mapping Agency, National Security Agency, etc.

<sup>16</sup> JOA—Joint Operating Area. An area of land, sea, and airspace defined by a geographic combatant commander or subordinate unified commander, in which a joint force commander (normally a joint task force commander) conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. (taken from JP 1-02 definition)

<sup>17</sup> A JPRCC will gain its perspective from both

augmentees (as JSRCs do now) and from liaison officers which all components send to the JFC. While JSRCs have always requested augmentation and liaison officers from other components, the other components frequently have only sent their air planners viewing the mission as CSAR and not PR.

<sup>18</sup> Command authority limited to the detailed and local direction and control over movements and maneuvers necessary to accomplish specific missions (taken from JP 1-02).

<sup>19</sup> JP 3-0 lists "support" as a command authority where one command should aid, protect, complement, or sustain another force in accordance with a directive requiring such action and can be used at any command echelon below combatant commander (SecDef frequently uses this between combatant commands, as well).

<sup>20</sup> Problems with the TACON relationship caused hours of delays for both rescues during Operation Allied Force (Kosovo in 1999). In the case of the downed F-16 pilot, the delay nearly caused the rescue force to attempt the mission under less-than-optimal daylight conditions in a medium threat environment when such risk wasn't necessary had the command relationships not been a problem.

<sup>21</sup> 18th Airborne Corps was the original Joint Task Force (JTF) for Millennium Challenge 02 (MC02), and they planned on experimenting with retaining the JSRC at the JTF. However, when contingency operations prevented their participation late in the preparation for MC02, this was cancelled.

<sup>22</sup> This also eliminates the potential of a PR mission running counter to another component's operation. During the rescue of Bat-21B (Lt Col Hambleton) in the late stages of Vietnam, ground forces felt their mission was sacrificed because the air component focused solely on the rescue of a downed airman. While the PR mission probably didn't cause any true disruption of the ground mission, the perception was that each component was fighting independent and contradictory battles.



## ALSA PROJECTS UPDATE

### CURRENT ALSA PUBLICATIONS

TITLE	DATE	PUB #	DESCRIPTION
<b>1. AMCI:</b> <i>Army and Marine Corps Integration in Joint Operations</i>	21 NOV 01	FM 3-31.1 (FM 90-31) MCWP 3-36	Describes the capabilities and limitations of selected Army and Marine Corps organizations and provides TTP for the integrated employment of these units in joint operations. The example used is C2 of a notional Army Brigade by a MEF or C2 of a MEB by an Army Corps. <b>POC: Team F</b> <a href="mailto:alsaf@langley.af.mil">alsaf@langley.af.mil</a>
<b>2. ARM-J:</b> <i>Antiradiation Missile Employment in a Joint Environment</i> <b>Classified SECRET</b>	JUL 02 (Under Revision/Incorporating with JSEAD pub)	FM 3-51.2 (FM 90-35) MCWP 3-22.1 NTTP 3-01.41 AFTTP(I) 3-2.11	Describes Service antiradiation missile platform capabilities, employment philosophies, ground/naval emitters, emitter ambiguities, and rules of engagement. Multi-Service procedures for antiradiation missile employment in a joint or multinational environment, with an emphasis on fratricide prevention. <b>Current Status:</b> Will be combined with ALSA JSEAD pub. Final Coordination Draft in world wide review. <b>POC: Team A:</b> <a href="mailto:alsaa@langley.af.mil">alsaa@langley.af.mil</a>
<b>3. AVIATION URBAN OPERATIONS:</b> <i>Multiservice Procedures For Aviation Urban Operations</i>	15 APR 01	FM 3-06.1 (FM 1-130) MCRP 3-35.3A NTTP 3-01.04 AFTTP(I) 3-2.29	MTTP for the tactical-level planning and execution of fixed- and rotary-wing aviation urban operations. <b>POC: Team E</b> <a href="mailto:alsae@langley.af.mil">alsae@langley.af.mil</a>
<b>4. BMO:</b> <i>Bomber Maritime Operations</i> <b>Classified SECRET</b>	JUN 00	MCRP 3-23 NTTP 3-03.5 AFTTP(I) 3-2.25	MTTP to inform bomber strike mission participants about typical fleet dispersal, and streamline communications procedures. Conversely, it assists naval strike planners to more efficiently utilize bomber assets and improve joint training opportunities. <b>Current Status:</b> To be rescinded in Feb 2004. <b>POC: Team E</b> <a href="mailto:alsae@langley.af.mil">alsae@langley.af.mil</a>
<b>5. BREVITY:</b> <i>Multiservice Brevity Codes</i> <b>Distribution Restricted</b>	05 JUN 03	FM 3-54.10 (FM 3-97.18) MCRP 3-25B NTTP 6-02.1 AFTTP(I) 3-2.5	A dictionary of multi-Service use brevity codes to augment JP 1-02, <i>DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms</i> . This pub standardizes air-to-air, air-to-surface, surface-to-air, and surface-to-surface brevity code words in multi-Service operations. <b>POC: Team F</b> <a href="mailto:alsaf@langley.af.mil">alsaf@langley.af.mil</a>
<b>6. COMCAM:</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Combat Camera Operations</i>	15 MAR 03	FM 3-55.12 MCRP 3-33.7A NTTP 3-13.12 AFTTP(I) 3-2.41	This publication fills the void that exists regarding combat camera doctrine, and assists JTF commanders in structuring and employing combat camera assets as an effective operational planning tool. <b>POC: Team G</b> <a href="mailto:alsag@langley.af.mil">alsag@langley.af.mil</a>
<b>7. EOD:</b> <i>Multi-Service Procedures for Explosive Ordnance Disposal in a Joint Environment</i>	15 FEB 01	FM 4-30.16 MCRP 3-17.2C NTTP 3-02.5 AFTTP(I) 3-2.32	Provides guidance and procedures for the employment of a joint explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) force. The manual assists commanders and planners in understanding the EOD capabilities of each Service. This publication will be revised in 2004. <b>POC: Team B</b> <a href="mailto:alsab@langley.af.mil">alsab@langley.af.mil</a>
<b>8. HF-ALE:</b> <i>Multi-Service Procedures for High Frequency-Automatic Link Establishment (HF-ALE) Radios</i>	01 SEP 03	FM 6-02.74 MCRP 3-40.3E NTTP 6-02.6 AFTTP(I) 3-2.48	Standardizes high power and low power HF-ALE operations across the Services and enable joint forces to use HF radio as a supplement / alternative to overburdened SATCOM systems for over-the-horizon communications. <b>POC: Team C</b> <a href="mailto:alsac@langley.af.mil">alsac@langley.af.mil</a>
<b>9. ICAC2:</b> <i>Multi-Service Procedures for Integrated Combat Airspace Command and Control</i>	30 JUN 00 (Will be reassessed upon publication of JP 3-52)	FM 3-52.1 (FM 100-103-1) MCRP 3-25D NTTP 3-52.1(Rev A) AFTTP(I) 3-2.16	Provides detailed TTP for airspace C2 to include specialized missions not covered in JP 3-52, <i>Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in a Combat Zone</i> . Includes specific information on interfaces and communications required to support integrated airspace control in a multiservice environment. <b>Current Status:</b> Attempting to incorporate information into JP 3-52. Pub will be retained until it is determined information is accepted. <b>POC: Team D</b> <a href="mailto:alsad@langley.af.mil">alsad@langley.af.mil</a>
<b>10. IDM:</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Improved Data Modem Integration</i> <b>Distribution Restricted</b>	30 MAY 03	FM 6-02.76 MCRP 3-25G NTTP 6-02.3 AFTTP(I) 3-2.38	Provides digital connectivity to a variety of attack and reconnaissance aircraft; facilitates exchange of near-real-time targeting data and improves tactical situational awareness by providing a concise picture of the multi-dimensional battlefield. <b>POC: Team C</b> <a href="mailto:alsac@langley.af.mil">alsac@langley.af.mil</a>
<b>11. IFF:</b> <i>MTTP for Mk XII IFF Mode 4 Security Issues in a Joint Integrated Air Defense System</i> <b>Classified SECRET</b>	JAN 03	FM 3-01.61 MCWP 3-25.11 NTTP 6-02.4 AFTTP(I) 3-2.39	The publication educates the warfighter to security issues associated with using the Mark XII IFF Mode 4 Combat Identification System in a joint integrated air defense environment. It captures TTP used today by the warfighter that can address those security issues. <b>Current Status:</b> NATO version released Nov 03. Reclassified (US) Version Released Dec 03 <b>POC: Team A</b> <a href="mailto:alsaa@langley.af.mil">alsaa@langley.af.mil</a>

Current as of: 1/23/2004  
POC: ALSA Pubs Officer

## ALSA PROJECTS UPDATE CURRENT ALSA PUBLICATIONS

TITLE	DATE	PUB #	DESCRIPTION
<b>12. JAAT:</b> <i>Multi-Service Procedures for Joint Air Attack Team Operations</i> <b>Revision is Distribution Restricted</b>	03 JUN 98 (Under Revision/Incorporating with JFIRE pub)	FM 3-09.33 (FM 90-21) MCRP 3-23.A NTTP 3-01.03 AFTTP(I) 3-2.10	Provides tactics for joint operations between attack helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft performing close air support (CAS). <b>Current Status:</b> JWG #1 scheduled at Nellis AGOS, 3-6 Feb 04  <b>POC:</b> Team A <a href="mailto:alsaa@langley.af.mil">alsaa@langley.af.mil</a>
<b>13. JAOC / AAMDC:</b> <i>Multi-Service Procedures for Joint Air Operations Center and Army Air and Missile Defense Command Coordination</i> <b>Revision is Distribution Restricted</b>	01 JAN 01 (Under Revision)	FM 3-01.20 MCRP 3-25.4A NTTP 3-01.6 AFTTP(I) 3-2.30	Addresses coordination requirements between the Joint Air Operations Center and the Army Air and Missile Defense Command. Assists the JFC, JFACC, and their staffs in developing a coherent approach to planning and execution of AMD operations. <b>Current Status:</b> Awaiting Command Approval  <b>POC:</b> Team D <a href="mailto:alsad@langley.af.mil">alsad@langley.af.mil</a>
<b>14. JATC:</b> <i>Multi-Service Procedures for Joint Air Traffic Control</i>	17 JUL 03	FM 3-52.3 (FM 100-104) MCRP 3-25A NTTP 3-56.3 AFTTP(I) 3-2.23	Ready reference source for guidance on ATC responsibilities, procedures, and employment in a joint environment. Discusses JATC employment and Service relationships for initial, transition, and sustained ATC operations across the spectrum of joint operations within the theater or area of responsibility (AOR). <b>POC:</b> Team F <a href="mailto:alsaf@langley.af.mil">alsaf@langley.af.mil</a>
<b>15. J-FIRE:</b> <i>Multiservice Procedures for Joint Application of Firepower</i> <b>Distribution Restricted</b>	01 NOV 02 (Under Revision)	FM 3-09.32 (FM 90-20) MCRP 3-16.6A NTTP 3-09.2 AFTTP(I) 3-2.6	A pocketsize guide of procedures for calls for fire, CAS, and naval gunfire. <b>Current Status:</b> Incorporating JAAT information. JWG #1 scheduled at Nellis AGOS, 3-6 Feb 04  <b>POC:</b> Team A <a href="mailto:alsaa@langley.af.mil">alsaa@langley.af.mil</a>
<b>16. JIADS:</b> <i>Multi-Service Procedures for a Joint Integrated Air Defense System</i> <b>Distribution Restricted</b>	08 JUN 01 (Under Revision)	FM 3-01.15 MCRP 3-25E NTTP 3-01.8 AFTTP(I) 3-2.31	This publication provides joint planners with a consolidated reference on Service air defense systems, processes, and structures, to include integration procedures. <b>*The revision will be entitled "Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for an Integrated Air Defense System (IADS)."</b> <b>Current status:</b> JWG #2 scheduled for 10-13 Feb 04 <b>POC:</b> Team D <a href="mailto:alsad@langley.af.mil">alsad@langley.af.mil</a>
<b>17. JSEAD:</b> <i>Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses</i> <b>Classified SECRET</b>	SEP 00 (Under Revision)	FM 3-01.4 MCRP 3-22.2A NTTP 3-01.42 AFTTP(I) 3-2.28	This publication provides detailed, classified tools for air operations planners and SEAD warfighters to aid in the planning and execution of SEAD operations in the joint environment. Incorporating ARM-J into this revision. <b>Current Status:</b> Final Coordination Draft in world wide review. <b>POC:</b> Team A <a href="mailto:alsaa@langley.af.mil">alsaa@langley.af.mil</a>
<b>18. JSTARS:</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System</i> <b>Distribution Restricted</b>	17 MAR 03	FM 3-55.6 (FM 90-37) MCRP 2-1E NTTP 3-55.13 (Rev A) AFTTP(I) 3-2.2	This publication provides procedures for the employment of the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) in dedicated support to the JFC. Revision will be unclassified. The unclassified revision describes multiservice TTP for consideration and use during planning and employment of the JSTARS.  <b>POC:</b> Team D <a href="mailto:alsad@langley.af.mil">alsad@langley.af.mil</a>
<b>19. JTF IM:</b> <i>Multiservice Procedures for Joint Task Force Information Management</i> <b>Distribution Restricted</b>	10 SEP 03	FM 6-02.85 (FM 101-4) MCRP 3-40.2A NTTP 3-13.1.16 AFTTP(I) 3-2.22	This publication describes how to manage, control, and protect information in a JTF headquarters conducting continuous operations. <b>POC:</b> Team G <a href="mailto:alsag@langley.af.mil">alsag@langley.af.mil</a>
<b>20. JTF Liaison Officer Integration:</b> <i>Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, And Procedures For Joint Task Force (JTF) Liaison Officer Integration</i>	27 JAN 03	FM 5-01.12 (FM 90-41) MCRP 5-1.B NTTP 5-02 AFTTP(I) 3-2.21	This publication defines liaison functions and responsibilities associated with standing up a JTF.  <b>POC:</b> Team B <a href="mailto:alsab@langley.af.mil">alsab@langley.af.mil</a>
<b>21. JTMTD:</b> <i>Multiservice Procedures Joint Theater Missile Target Development</i> <b>Distribution Restricted</b>	11 Nov 03	FM 3-01.51 (FM 90-43) NTTP 3-01.13 AFTTP(I) 3-2.24	The JTMTD publication documents TTPs for threat missile target development in early entry and mature theater operations. It provides a common understanding of the threat missile target set and information on the component elements involved in target development and attack operations. <b>POC:</b> Team D <a href="mailto:alsad@langley.af.mil">alsad@langley.af.mil</a>

Current as of: 1/23/2004

## ALSA PROJECTS UPDATE CURRENT ALSA PUBLICATIONS

TITLE	DATE	PUB #	DESCRIPTION
<b>22. NLW:</b> <i>Tactical Employment of Nonlethal Weapons</i>	15 JAN 03	FM 3-22.40 (FM 90-40) MCWP 3-15.8 NTTP 3-07.3.2 AFTTP(I) 3-2.45 USCG Pub 3-07.31	- Supplements established doctrine and TTP. - Provides a source of reference material to assist commanders and staffs in planning/ coordinating tactical operations. - Incorporates the latest lessons learned from real world and training operations, and examples of TTP from various sources. <b>POC:</b> Team C <a href="mailto:alsac@langley.af.mil">alsac@langley.af.mil</a>
<b>23. PEACE OPS:</b> <i>MTTP for Peace Operations</i>	26 OCT 03	FM 3-07.31 MCWP 3-33.8 AFTTP(I) 3-2.40	This publication provides the tactical level guidance to the warfighter for conducting peace operations. <b>POC:</b> Team E <a href="mailto:alsac@langley.af.mil">alsac@langley.af.mil</a>
<b>24. REPROGRAMMING:</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Reprogramming of Electronic Warfare and Target Sensing</i> <b>Distribution Restricted</b>	06 JAN 03	FM 3-51.1 (FM 34-72) MCRP 3-40.5B NTTP 3-13.1.15 AFTTP(I) 3-2.7	This publication supports the JTF staff in the planning, coordinating, and executing of reprogramming of electronic warfare and target sensing systems as part of joint force command and control warfare operations. <b>POC:</b> Team G <a href="mailto:alsag@langley.af.mil">alsag@langley.af.mil</a>
<b>25. RM:</b> <i>Risk Management</i>	15 FEB 01	FM 3-100.12 (FM 5-19.1) MCRP 5-12.1C NTTP 5-03.5 AFTTP(I) 3-2.34	Provides a consolidated multi-Service reference, addressing risk management background, principles, and application procedures. To facilitate multi-Service interoperability, it identifies and explains the risk management process and its differences and similarities as it is applied by each Service. <b>POC:</b> Team C <a href="mailto:alsac@langley.af.mil">alsac@langley.af.mil</a>
<b>26. SURVIVAL:</b> <i>Multiservice Procedures for Survival, Evasion, and Recovery</i> <b>Distribution Restricted</b>	19 MAR 03	FM 3-50.3 (FM 21-76-1) MCRP 3-02H NTTP 3-50.3 AFTTP(I) 3-2.26	This publication provides a weather-proof, pocket-sized, quick reference guide of basic survival information to assist Service members in a survival situation regardless of geographic location. <b>POC:</b> Team B <a href="mailto:alsab@langley.af.mil">alsab@langley.af.mil</a>
<b>27. TADIL-J:</b> <i>Introduction to Tactical Digital Information Link J and Quick Reference Guide</i>	30 JUN 00 (Incorporating with FORSCOM JTAO Handbook)	FM 6-24.8 (FM 6-02.241) MCRP 3-25C NTTP 6-02.5 AFTTP(I) 3-2.27	Provides a guide for warfighters with limited or no experience or background in TADIL J and needing a quick orientation for supplemental or in-depth information. TADIL J is also known in NATO as Link 16. <b>Current Status:</b> The information in this publication will be incorporated into the FORSCOM Joint Tactical Air Operations Procedural Handbook. ECD: Fall 2004 <b>POC:</b> Team C <a href="mailto:alsac@langley.af.mil">alsac@langley.af.mil</a>
<b>28. TAGS:</b> <i>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Theater Air Ground System</i>	8 DEC 03	FM 3-52.2 (FM 100-103-2) MCRP 3-25F NTTP 3-56.2 AFTTP(I) 3-2.17	This publication promotes inter-Service awareness regarding the role of airpower in support of the JFC's campaign plan, increases understanding of the air-ground system, and provides planning considerations for the conduct of air-ground operations. <b>POC:</b> Team D <a href="mailto:alsad@langley.af.mil">alsad@langley.af.mil</a>
<b>29. TACTICAL RADIOS:</b> <i>Multi-Service Communications Procedures for Tactical Radios in a Joint Environment</i>	14 JUN 02	FM 6-02.72 (FM 11-1) MCRP 3-40.3A NTTP 6-02.2 AFTTP(I) 3-2.18	Standardizes joint operational procedures for Single-Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems (SINCGARS) and provides and overview of the multi-Service applications of Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLARS). <b>POC:</b> Team C <a href="mailto:alsac@langley.af.mil">alsac@langley.af.mil</a>
<b>30. TMD IPB:</b> <i>Multiservice Procedures for Theater Missile Defense Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace</i>	04 MAR 02	FM 3-01.16 MCRP 2-12.1A NTTP 2.01.2 AFTTP(I) 3-2.36	This publication provides a systematic and common methodology for analyzing the theater adversary missile force in its operating environment. <b>POC:</b> Team G <a href="mailto:alsag@langley.af.mil">alsag@langley.af.mil</a>
<b>31. UXO:</b> <i>Multi-Service Procedures for Unexploded Ordnance Operations (UXO)</i>	23 AUG 01	FM 3-100.38 MCRP 3-17.2B NTTP 3-02.4.1 AFTTP(I) 3-2.12	This publication describes hazards of unexploded explosive ordnance (UXO) sub- munitions to land operations, addresses UXO planning considerations, and describes the architecture for reporting and tracking UXO during combat and post conflict. Revision scheduled for 2004. <b>POC:</b> Team B <a href="mailto:alsab@langley.af.mil">alsab@langley.af.mil</a>



NEW ALSA PROJECTS			
TITLE	EST PUB DATE	PUB #	DESCRIPTION AND STATUS
<b>Airbase Opening:</b>	TBD	A: TBD M: TBD N: TBD AF: TBD	Team E is currently in the research phase of this project. <b>Current Status:</b> Research Phase. <b>POC: Team E</b> <a href="mailto:alsae@langley.af.mil">alsae@langley.af.mil</a>
<b>ADUS: MTTP for AIR DEFENSE of the United States</b> <b>Classified</b> <b>SECRET/RELCAN</b>	FEB 04	A: FM 3-01.1 N: NTTP 3-26.1.1 AF: AFTTP(I) 3-2.50	This MTTP supports planners, warfighters, and interagency personnel participating in air defense of the US by providing planning, coordination, and execution information. Pub is primarily focused at the tactical level. Includes Operation NOBLE EAGLE and Clear Skies Exercise lessons learned. <b>Current Status:</b> Awaiting Command Approval. <b>POC: Team E</b> <a href="mailto:alsae@langley.af.mil">alsae@langley.af.mil</a>
<b>HAVE QUICK</b>	TBD	A: FM 6-02.771 M: MCRP 3-40.3F N: NTTP 6-02.7 AF: AFTTP(I) 3-2.49	Will simplify planning and coordination of HAVE QUICK radio procedures and responds to the lack of HAVE QUICK TTP throughout the Services. Additionally, it provide operators information on multi-Service HAVE QUICK communication systems while conducting home station training or in preparation for interoperability training. <b>Current Status:</b> Awaiting Command Approval. <b>POC TEAM C</b> <a href="mailto:alsac@langley.af.mil">alsac@langley.af.mil</a>
<b>DETAINEE OPERATIONS</b> <i>MTTP for Detainee Operations in a Joint Environment</i> <b>Distribution Restricted</b>	MAR 04	A: TBD M: TBD N: NTTP 3-07.8 AF: TBD	MTTP regarding detainee operations (unprivileged belligerents) to include transporting, transferring and holding of the high-risk detainees. <b>Current Status:</b> Adjudicating Final Coordination Draft comments. <b>POC TEAM B</b> <a href="mailto:alsab@langley.af.mil">alsab@langley.af.mil</a>
<b>UHF TACSAT/ DAMA OPERATIONS</b>	TBD	A: TBD M: TBD N: TBD AF: TBD	Recent operations at JTF level have demonstrated difficulties in managing limited number of UHF TACSAT frequencies. TTP documented in this publication will improve efficiency at the planner and user levels. <b>Current Status:</b> Adjudicating Final Coordination Draft comments. <b>POC TEAM C</b> <a href="mailto:alsac@langley.af.mil">alsac@langley.af.mil</a>
<b>TST: MTTP for Targeting Time Sensitive Targets</b> <b>Distribution Restricted</b>	APR 04	A: TBD M: TBD N: NTTP 3-60.1 AF: TBD	This publication provides the JFC, the JFC's operational staff, and components unclassified MTTP to coordinate, de-conflict, synchronize, and prosecute TSTs within any AOR. Combines Joint Fires Initiative/TST, Draft Navy/Air Force TST CONOPS, COMUSCENTAF Combined-Counter-SCUD CONOPS, and includes OIF and OEF lessons learned. <b>Current Status:</b> Final Coordination Draft in world wide review. S: 30 Jan 04 <b>POC TEAM F</b> <a href="mailto:alsaf@langley.af.mil">alsaf@langley.af.mil</a>
<b>Interpreter Ops</b>	TBD	A: TBD M: TBD N: TBD AF: TBD	Team B has researched this project. Program approval is scheduled for Feb 2004. <b>Current Status:</b> Research Phase. <b>POC TEAM B</b> <a href="mailto:alsab@langley.af.mil">alsab@langley.af.mil</a>

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